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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CONSENSUS, CERTAINTY AND THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Frances Hamilton1 
Abstract: There remains no right to same-sex marriage before the European Court of Human 
Rights(‘European Court.’) Yet it seems likely that at some stage the European Court will 
recognise same-sex marriage. Recent dicta stresses the movement towards legal recognition 
across Member States. It is only a lack of consensus, leading to a wide Margin of Appreciation, 
which prevents the European Court recognising same-sex marriage. This piece proposes that 
if the European Court continues with this approach, they should at least outline in future 
judgments how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex marriage, 
before they will determine that a consensus will exist. This is due to the constitutional, manifold 
legal and symbolic implications of marriage.  It is essential for a same-sex couple to know 
when their marriage will be legally recognised. If done in a consistent manner, this would 
increase the legitimacy of the European Court and has the major advantages of transparency, 
certainty and predictability.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
There continues to be no right to same sex-marriage before the European Court.2  Following 
Oliari v Italy, Member States are obliged to provide same-sex couples with some form of civil 
partnership or registered partnership.3 This is a breakthrough for same-sex partners4  although 
in its judgment the European Court concentrated upon the difference between the lack of legal 
                                                          
1 Frances Hamilton is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Northumbria University. 
 
2 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, App No 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010), Hämäläinen v Finland App No 37359/09 
(ECtHR, 16 July 2014) and Chapin and Charpentier v France, App No 40183/07 (ECtHR 9 June 2016). 
3 Oliari v Italy (Apps. Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, ECtHR 31 July 2015). 
 
4  Zago, G. ‘A Victory for Italian Same-Sex Couples, a Victory for European Homosexuals? A Commentary on 
Oliari v Italy’ (2015) Articolo 29 Leiden University. 
and protections in Italy and the ‘social reality of the applicants’ who were widely accepted.5 
Fenwick and Hayward argue that the European Court by doing this ‘sought to relate its scope 
to circumstances arising locally, in Italy, and most likely to arise in Western European States.’6 
In addition, although civil partnership is increasingly seen as having an intrinsic value in itself7 
this will also not satisfy those proponents of same-sex marriage who view marriage as the gold 
standard.8  
However, recognition of same-sex marriage by the European Court at some stage now seems 
likely. Stress was placed by the European Court in Oliari v Italy on the ‘movement towards 
legal recognition’ and the ‘continuing international trend of legal recognition of same-sex 
couples.’9 The European Court justifies the reason for not introducing same-sex marriage on 
the lack of consensus between Member States10 This lack of consensus leads to a wide Margin 
of Appreciation (‘MoA’) otherwise known as area of discretion,11 given to Member States. 
Today 15 Member States recognise same-sex marriage. 12  This accords with a ‘global 
                                                          
5 Oliari v Italy (n3) para 73. 
 
6 Fenwick, H. and Hayward A. ‘Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically’ [2017] 6 EHRLR Forthcoming 12. 
 
7 Vallianatos v Greece (Apps. Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, ECtHR 7 November 2013 and Oliari v Italy (n3) 
and Fenwick and Hayward (n6).  
 
8 See Sue Wilkinson in her Witness Statement contained in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) para 
6.  
 
9 See Oliari v Italy (n3). Sutherland, E. ‘A Step Closer to Same-Sex Marriage Throughout Europe’ (2011) 15 Edin 
L Rev 97, 98 states that “[e]ven on the Court’s reasoning, it is arguably only a matter of time (perhaps some time) 
until the right to marry becomes a reality for same-sex couples throughout Europe.” 
10 See Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2) para 57, Hämäläinen v Finland (n2) para 39 and Chapin and Charpentier 
v France (n2). 
 
11 See Butler, P. (2008-2009) ‘Margin of Appreciation - A Note Towards a Solution for the Pacific’ (2008-2009) 
39 Vic U Wellington L Rev 687 and Yourow, H.C. (1996) Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of 
European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Brill, Netherlands, 1996). 
 
12 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (apart from Northern Ireland).   
 
movement to legalise same-sex marriage.’13 Reform is by no means complete as certain Central 
and Eastern European states continue to ban same-sex marriage and constitutionally define 
marriage as between a man and a woman.14 Russia, a Council of Europe Member State seems 
to be a long way away from considering protections for same-sex couples.15 A claim is now 
being brought to the European Court from three same-sex couples in Russia who are claiming 
a right to same-sex marriage.16 As Russia has no form of legal protection for same-sex couples, 
the European Court are considering the matter as a ‘claim for some means of formalising their 
relationship in Russia, via a form of registered partnership.’17 It remains to be seen whether the 
European Court will confine to Oliari v Italy to countries where same-sex couples are socially 
accepted, which is very different from the homophobia present in Russian society. What will 
be crucial in the European Court’s analysis here is the level of consensus deemed to exist 
between Member States on this issue. 
It remains debateable as to whether the European Court is following the correct approach in 
considering lack of consensus, leading to a wide MoA, as determinative in relation to same-
sex marriage. Commentators argue that placing such emphasis on consensus ignores the 
interests of the minority group.18  They also argue that in cases that fall within the MoA doctrine 
                                                          
13 Poppelwell-Scevak C.A.R.L. (2016). The European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The 
Consensus Approach. Norwegian Open Research Archives (NORA). 
14 Same-sex marriage is not recognised in several European countries and in addition, marriage is defined as a 
union solely between a man and a woman in the constitutions of Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. See Fenwick, H., ‘Same Sex Unions and the 
Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority Via 
Consensus Analysis’ (2016) 3 EHRLR 248.  See also Fenwick and Hayward (n6). 
 
15 See Fenwick (n14) 270 who explains that gay propaganda laws are still in force in Russia. See also Fenwick 
and Hayward who refer to the ‘state-based and social acceptance of homophobia’ p22. See also Johnson, P. 
‘Homosexual Propaganda’ in the Russian Federation: Are They in Violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights?’ (2015) 3(2) Russ. LJ 37 
 
16 Fedetova and Shipitko v Russia communicated on 2 May 2016.  
 
17 Fenwick and Hayward (n6) 22. 
 
18 See Fenwick (n14) and Dzehtsiarou, K. ‘Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 3 PL 534, Hodson, L., ‘A Marriage by Any Other 
due to there being no consensus, there is a lack of legal analysis19 and no high level of 
scrutiny.20 Instead the consensus standards results in a fact dependent approach, with ‘little, if 
any constraints on state power.’21 This author has written elsewhere that such an approach 
means that Member States could be relying on erroneous 22  or discriminatory reasons in 
refusing to sanction same-sex marriage, which reasons are not investigated by the European 
Court.23  This article sets out a novel approach by suggesting that if the European Court 
continues to stress the need for consensus in future judgements regarding same-sex marriage, 
they should at least outline how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-
sex marriage, before they will determine that a consensus will exist. Certainty is needed. This 
is due to the constitutional, manifold legal and symbolic implications of marriage.  It is essential 
for a couple to know when their marriage will be legally recognised.24 This is also stressed by 
                                                          
Name? Shalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 11(1) HRLR 170; Sweeney, J.A. ‘Margin of Appreciation: Cultural 
Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era (2005) 54 ICLQ 459; Lord Lester, 
‘The European Convention in the New Architecture of Europe’ (1996) 1 PL 6 and Benvenisti, E.,’Margin of 
Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards (1998-1999) 31 NYUJ of Inter L and Politics 843. 
 
19 Lewis, T. ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ (2007) 
56 ICLQ 395.414 comments that the MoA should not be used as an ‘intellectually lazy option of running for 
cover.’ 
 
20 See for discussion Hutchinson, M. ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human 
Rights’(1999) 48 ICLQ 638 and Brauch J. The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law (2004-2005) 11 Columbia J or Eur L113. 
 
21 Shany, Y., ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law’ (2005) 16(5) Eur J of 
Inter L 907, 912  
 
22 For example Member States could be relying on discredited arguments such as the slippery slope argument (that 
same-sex marriage would lead to polygamy for example) as well as the definitional argument (that ‘traditions 
change and dictionaries are not the law’ and the procreation argument (that marriage is for procreative purposes 
only). 
 
23 Hamilton, F. ‘Why the Margin of Appreciation is not the Answer to the Gay Marriage Debate’  (2013) 1 
EHRLR 47. 
 
24 In Estin v Estin, 334 US 541, 553 (1948) Robert Jackson J commented that “one thing that people are entitled 
to know from the law is whether they are formally married”. See also Stark, B.‘When Globalization Hits Home: 
International Family Law Comes of Age’ (2006) 36 Vanderbilt J of Trans L. 1551 and McClain, L. ‘Deliberative 
Democracy, Overlapping Consensus and Same-Sex Marriage, (1997-1998) Fordham L R 1241. 
 
international case law25 and international human rights covenants.26 Marriage bestows many 
legal rights27 and is often connected to citizenship.28  
The suggested approach will increase the legitimacy of the European Court as it would link 
any new decision on movement of consensus in relation to same-sex marriage back to a 
democratic mandate of the legislatures of Member States. This is needed at a time when certain 
political factions are discussing leaving the Council of Europe.29 The proposed reform also has 
the major advantages of transparency, certainty and predictability. The next section sets out the 
conundrum facing the European Court in balancing the competing tensions of universalism and 
relativism in relation to same-sex marriage. Section 3 then details a critique of the existing 
interpretation of consensus. Section 4 then sets out case law from the area of sexualities 
demonstrating the lack of certainty over how consensus is determined. Section 5 then considers 
the proposed reform in more detail and considers the advantages this would bring.  
 
2. THE COMPROMISE BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND RELATIVISM  
 
                                                          
25 See eg Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass 2003); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 
(1967) and Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015). 
 
26 Eg Article 12 Right to Marry European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
27 Eg on intestacy, inheritance and tax purposes 
 
28 See Bamforth, N., ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument’ (2012) 10(2) Inter J 
Const L 477; Frimston, R., ‘Marriage and Non-Marital Registered Partnerships: Gold, Silver and Bronze in Private 
International Law” (2006) Private Client Business 352 and Aloni, E., ‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the 
Possibility of Predicting Same-Sex Marriage’ (2010–2011) 18 Duke J of Gender L and Pol’y 105. 
 
29 Bribosia, E., Rorive, I. and Van den Eynde, L. ‘Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European 
Court of Human Rights in Light of the US Experience’ 2014 32(1) Berkeley J of Inter L 1 referring to Wintemute, 
R. (2010). Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights, Guardian, August 12, 2010. 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/aug/12/european-court-human-rights-consensus (Last checked 13 July 
2017). 
 
One of the central challenges for the European Court is to uphold the universal standard of 
human rights, whilst respecting regional differences. Fenwick and Hayward explain that in the 
context of rights to legal recognition of same-sex couples, there is much difficulty for the 
European Court in ‘adjudicating in an increasingly nationalistic context’30  where Eastern 
European countries take a much more conservative approach in this regard.31 Yet this approach 
by the European Court attracts much criticism. Popplewell-Scevak argues that given the 
European Convention of Human Rights (‘European Convention’) Preamble’s promise to 
‘protect and enforce human rights… it is perplexing to see the court refrain from legalising 
same-sex marriage….’32 Some commentators state that the European Court should have a 
leading, standard setting, aspirational role.33 Benvenisti for example argues that the European 
Court has a ‘duty to set universal standards.’34 This would mean in relation to same-sex 
marriage that the European Court should no longer rely a lack of consensus leading to a wide 
MoA.  Indeed the European Court is well aware that the European Convention cannot be 
‘frozen in time.’35  Concepts such as ‘living instrument’ allow the European Court to operate 
‘evolutive’ and ‘dynamic’ interpretative techniques so that the European Convention can be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions rather than what the drafters thought back in 
                                                          
30 Fenwick and Hayward (n6) 2. 
 
31 See Fenwick and Hayward (n6) 5  and n14. 
 
32 Poppelwell-Scevak (n13) 1.  
 
33 See Dzehtsiarou, (n18) 540. Dzehtsiarou 540 also refers to Ronald Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ 
in Ronald Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights (Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 24 who argues that consensus would mean the European Court 
would ‘forfeit its aspirational role’.  Shuibne N., ‘Margins of appreciation; National values, fundamental rights 
and EC free movement law’ (2009) 34(2) Eur L. Rev 230, 256 also argues that when interpreting the role of the 
EU Charter in an EU context there is a ‘discrete supranational’ purpose in advancing fundamental rights.  
34 Benvenisti (n18) 843.  
 
35 Tobin, B., ‘Gay Marriage – A Bridge Too Far?’ (2007) 15 Ire. Stud. L Rev 175 referring to the Irish Supreme 
Court decision in Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners [2008] 2 IR 417 
the 1950s.36 Such techniques are used throughout the case law which will be examined in the 
relevant area of sexualities and family law.37  
However, in an area as sensitive as same-sex marriage, the European Court wishes to avoid 
any charge that it is engaging in ‘judicial politics.’38  Unlike the role of the Supreme Court in 
the US for instance, the European Court has to constantly adhere to the states’ MoA.’39 There 
needs to be a compromise between the competing interests at stake. The MoA alongside 
consensus (which latter is one of the key factors in determining the width of the MoA) are the 
‘primary tools’40 employed by the European Court in its case law on same-sex marriage in 
ensuring it does not overstep the ‘primary responsibility’ 41  given under the  European 
Convention to Member States to secure human rights.42 The doctrine of subsidiarity43 has been 
recently re-emphasised.44 The role of the European Court is in fact secondary. Its task is to 
‘examine the domestic decision’ and ensure compatibility with the European Convention.45 
This is all part of securing agreement and social cooperation in the face of moral pluralism,46 
                                                          
36 See Letsas, G., ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretative Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21(3) EJIL 509 
for further explanation.  
 
37 For example trans gender persons have transformed their position, to allow full recognition of rights in their 
new sex. See Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, App No 28957/95 (ECtHR 11 July 2002). See section 4.  
 
38 Benvenisti (n18) 846.  
 
39 See Teutonico, D. ‘Pajic v Croatia’ (2016-2017) 25 Tulane J of Inter and Comp L 461. 
 
40 Donoho, D.L. ‘Autonomy, self-governance, and the margin of appreciation: Developing a jurisprudence of 
diversity within universal human right (2001) 15 Em Inter L Rev 391, 451. 
 
41 McGoldrick,D. (2016) 65(1) ‘A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by 
the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 65(1) ICLQ 21, 32. 
 
42 Hutchinson (n20). 
 
43  Art 1 European Convention. Fenwick (n14) 250 also emphasises the importance of ‘subsidiarity related 
devices.’ 
 
44 Council of Europe, ‘Brighton Declaration High Level Conference on the Future of the ECHR’, available 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf (2012)  B 12  
 
45 Hutchinson (n20) 640. 
 
46 McClain (n24). 
which is particularly important in an area such as same-sex marriage. As set out above it 
remains debateable, as to whether the European Court is following the correct approach in this 
regard.47 However, as the European Court currently determines that a lack of consensus is 
decisive in reaching a wide MoA,48 this piece argues that at least more clarity and guidance is 
needed as to when a consensus is deemed to have been reached.  As stated above, there are 
constitutional, manifold legal and symbolic implications of marriage.49 Couples are entitled to 
know when they will be able to enter into a same-sex marriage.  
3. THE CONSENSUS STANDARD CRITIQUED 
 
Commentators argue that consensus in relation to many human rights, is often the most 
important factor in determining the width of the MoA given to a Member State.50 When 
considering same-sex marriage, it is clear that lack of consensus is the critical factor.51 The 
MoA varies greatly depending what rights are involved. 52 It can and frequently does evolve 
over time.  Factors which are commonly cited in determining the width of the MoA include the 
importance of the right, the Member State interest involved and whether there is a consensus 
                                                          
  
47 See Introduction. 
 
48 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2) para 57, Hämäläinen v Finland (n2) para 39 and Chapin and Charpentier v 
France (n2).  
 
49 See Section 1 Introduction.  
 
50 For example Lewis (n19), Wada, E. ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide’ (2005) 27 
Loy. of L.A. Inter. and Comp. L. Rev. 275, Butler (n11), Nigro, R., ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the 
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic Veil’ (2010) 11 HRLR 531;  Hutchinson (n20); 
Brauch (n20) and McClain (n24).  
 
51 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2) para 57, Hämäläinen v Finland (n2) para 39 and Chapin and Charpentier v 
France (n2).  
 
52 Fenwick (n14) 251 states that in practice ‘uncertainty arises in respect of every aspect of it.’ See also Poppelwell-
Scevak (n13).  
 
on an issue.53 Certain rights are given a narrow MoA.54  Equally, certain vulnerable groups, 
including gay people are given extra protection.55  Where discrimination concerns gay people 
for example, the Member State will need to have ‘very weighty reasons for the restriction in 
question.’56  Logically, now that same-sex couples fall under the definition of family under 
article 8,57 the ‘very weighty reasons’ test should lead to a breach of Article 12 (right to 
marriage) being found in relation to same-sex couples bar from marriage. Such was the view 
of the minority judges in Schalk and Kopf v Austria.58 It is only because the European Court 
determines there to be a wide MoA (due to a lack of consensus) in relation to marriage under 
Article 12, which prevents the European Court moving forward in this area.59  
Many of the criticisms surrounding MoA and its key factor of consensus centre around the fact 
that it is very difficult to understand how it works and that it is lacking in predictability.60  Some 
commentators even argue that it is not ‘consistent with the rule of law.’’61  There is no certainty 
as to when the European Court will determine that sufficient consensus has been reached to 
recognise same-sex marriage.   Bribosia et al reject the consensus argument on the basis that it 
is ‘fraught with methodological imprecision.’ 62  Confusion reigns with regards to the 
                                                          
53 See Donoho (n40) for further explanation. 
 
54 For example privacy and personal autonomy. Dudgeon v United Kingdom, App No 7525/76 (ECtHR 22 October 
1981).  
 
55 Ibid.. See McGoldrick (n41) 25.  
. 
56 Karner v Austria App No 40016/98 (ECtHR 24 July 2003).  
  
57 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2) 
.  
58 Ibid.  Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens para 8 
 
59 See for example Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2). 
 
60 Wada (n50) 280, Butler (n11) 702, Hutchinson (n20) 641, Brauch (n20) 121, Shany (n21) 932, Benvenisti (n18) 
844, McGoldrick (n41) and Lester (n18).   
 
61 Brauch (n20) 138. 
 
62 Bribosia et al (n29) 18.  
 
terminology used, and multiple terms are used including ‘common European standard’, 
‘common European approach’, ‘emerging consensus’ or ‘trend.’63 The European Court also 
demonstrates no consistency in determining what sources are appropriate for establishing a 
consensus.64 For example on occasion emphasis has been placed on scientific reports, and this 
emphasis is later disregarded in similar cases.65 There are also issues arising in relation to the 
thoroughness of the research on which the European Court makes its decision.66  
However, the emphasis placed on consensus as the determinative factor for the width of the 
MoA ensures that the European Court is acting in concert with domestic authorities and within 
the dictates of subsidiarity.67 Debate continues about the appropriateness of stressing consensus 
in relation to same-sex marriage.68 This article suggests that if the European Court in future 
judgments continues to concentrate on the need for consensus, they should at least outline how 
many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex marriage, before they will 
determine that a consensus will exist.  This will increase the legitimacy of the European Court, 
as it will link the European Court’s decision back to the democratic mandate of the Member 
States’ legislatures. If applied in such a manner, the doctrine of consensus could be an 
important legitimising tool. This could give the European Court’s judgments in this area extra 
weight, which is useful at a time when certain political factions are discussing leaving the 
                                                          
63 Popplewell-Scezak (n13) 39.  
 
64 Dzhetsiarou (n29) 544. 
 
65 Look at adoption cases Frette v France App No 36515/97 (ECtHR 26 Februrary 2002) which placed emphasis 
on the division in the scientific community about the effect which individual gay adoption would have on the 
child.  This approach was subsequently regarded as discriminatory. X and Others v. Austria App No 19010/07 
(ECtHR 19 February 2013)  
 
66 Dzehtsiarou (n18) 539.   
 
67 McGoldrick (n41) 28  referring to Nicolas Bratza, Evidence to UK Joint Committee on Human Rights, 13 March 
2012, HC 873-iii Q140, former President of the European Court, who saw this as a safeguard ‘to prevent any rapid 
and arbitrary development of the Convention’. See also Dzehtsiarou (n18).   
 
68 See Introduction.  
 
Council of Europe.69 The next section examines the lack of certainty resulting from how the 
European Court has applied the doctrine of consensus in its developing line of case law 
concerning sexualities.  
4. CASE LAW DEMONSTRATING THE LACK OF CERTAINTY OVER HOW 
CONSENSUS IS DETERMINED  
In the area of family law and sexualities, the European Court has employed a dynamic 
interpretative technique. The European Court has not been insistent on demonstrating 
consensus in order to move case law forwards.  Indeed it has been prepared to depart from 
previous precedents in the areas of decriminalisation of.same-sex sexual activity,70 equalisation 
of the age of consent for same-sex couples,71 same-sex couples’ tenancy rights,72 employment 
of gay people in the military,73 definition of family concerning gay people,74 gay persons’ right 
to adopt75 and most recently same-sex couples’ rights to form civil partnerships76 all without 
demonstrating a consistent method as to how consensus is determined. All of this case law has 
meant a progressive approach to the development of gay rights and has to be applauded as such. 
Fenwick and Hayward also argue that a further move towards an increasing consensus in 
relation to legal recognition of same-sex couples rights can be done by removing ‘asymmetry 
                                                          
69 See n29. 
 
70 Dudgeon v UK (n54).  
 
71 Sutherland v UK App No 25186/94 (ECtHR 1 July 1997).  
 
72 Simpson v UK App No 11716/85 (ECtHR 14 May 1986) and Karner v Austria (n56).  
 
73 Smith and Grady v UK App Nos 33985/96 and 33986/96 (ECtHR 27 September 1999) and Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett v UK App Nos 31417/96 and 32377/96 (ECtHR 27 September 1999). 
 
74 X and Y v UK App No 21830/93 (ECtHR 22 April 1997), Kerkhoven and Hinke v Netherlands App No 
15666/89, Judgment (ECtHR 19 May 1992), JRM v The Netherlands App No 16944/90 (ECtHR 8 February 2003) 
and Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2).  
 
75 Frette v France (n57) and EB v France App No 43546/02 (ECtHR 22 January 2008). 
 
76 Oliari v Italy (n8). 
 
of access’ to protected legal partnerships.77 They explain asymmetry of access to arise when 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples are given different legal statuses. Erasing asymmetry of 
access in the context of Western European countries this would mean removing inequalities 
where same-sex couples can only access registered partnerships and not marriage.78 Such a 
course of action together with an increasing number of Eastern European countries introducing 
for the first time some level of registered partnership, would undoubtedly increase the pressure 
on the European Court to recognise an increasing level of consensus.79 In turn this would make 
the position of Eastern European countries which afford same-sex couples no legal protections 
as being seen to be ‘increasingly anomalous.’80 However, there would still remain doubt as to 
when the European Court would deem there to be a sufficient level of consensus to recognise 
a right to same-sex marriage. There is an underlying problem in that the European Court has 
shown no consistent application as to determine when consensus exists. The European Court 
is insistent on consensus being the decisive factor here,81 but its case law leaves no clues as to 
when this will be determined to exist. Key cases are now examined in more detail.  
 
The first in this important line of cases is Dudgeon v UK, which concerned criminalisation of 
sodomy in Northern Ireland. This was subsequently found to contravene article 8 (right to 
respect for private life) and has been lauded as ‘open[ing] the door for LGBTQI rights to be 
include under the [European] Convention.’82 A flaw in the judgment for those seeking to 
understand when the European Court will advance the case for same-sex marriage, is that the 
                                                          
77 They define asymmetry of access to mean 
 
78 Fenwick and Hayward (n6) 30 -31.  
79  
80 Fenwick and Hayward (n6).  
 
81 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2), Oliari v Italy (n3) and Chapin v Charpentier (n2).  
 
82 Popplewell-Scezak (n13) 9. 
 
European Court never thoroughly explained its departure from previous case law. The reversal 
of precedent was done on the basis of a ‘better understanding, and in consequence an increased 
tolerance, of homosexual behaviour in the great majority of Member States.’83 Little guidance 
was given as to what was meant about a ‘better understanding.’84 The European Court did 
consider other domestic laws85 but never thoroughly documented how many other Member 
States’ legislatures were required to have introduced legislation. Letsas criticises this as 
instance of the European Court making a ‘moral’ decision, rather than determining ‘some 
commonly accepted standards.’86 Confusing terminology such as ‘better understanding’ does 
little to develop our understanding of when a sufficient consensus will be reached in relation 
to same-sex marriage.  
 
Brauch also considers that case law demonstrates that the European Court utilises the concept 
of MoA, with its key factor of consensus, in a manner which results in the standard sometimes 
changing without warning.87 The case he discusses concerned gay peoples’ employment in the 
military.88 Previously national security defences put forward by Member States were given a 
wide MoA.89 In Smith and Grady v UK, the European Court determined (despite the argument 
to the contrary by the UK government)90 that no defence could be upheld on the basis of 
                                                          




85 Ibid.  
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national security.  This was because ‘particularly serious reasons’ had to exist in relation to 
restrictions which concerned the ‘most intimate part of an individuals’ private life’. 91 
Ultimately, the UK were not successful in their defence which the European Court interpreted 
as ‘founded solely upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards those of 
homosexual orientation.’92 Despite previously national security defences being given a wide 
MoA,93  suddenly no MoA was given to the UK. Again, although advancing LGBT rights, the 
sudden shift in position by the European Court was unpredictable. The UK had prepared their 
defence on the basis of a wide MoA and had no notice from the European Court that this no 
longer existed, arguably meaning that the UK did not prepare its case to best effect.  
The case of Karner v Austria,94 considered the rights of a surviving same-sex partner to inherit 
a tenancy. The European Court again departed from previous precedent95 to find a breach of 
Article 14 (equality) in conjunction with Article 8 (privacy).96 The issue of consensus was 
avoided. Although third party interveners brought up international examples of equal treatment 
of unmarried same-sex and opposite-sex couples,97 these were not considered in the European 
Court’s judgment. Instead, the European Court introduced a new dicta that ‘weighty reasons’ 
were needed in justifying differences in treatment between opposite sex and same-sex 
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partners.98 Whilst the case was obviously an advance for GLBT rights by making any Member 
States’ discriminatory law against gay people subject to a heightened test, it did not address the 
issue concerning consensus. It offers no clues to be able to predict when a consensus will be 
deemed to exist in relation to same-sex marriage.  
Another change from previous case law occurred in the recognition of same-sex relationships 
under the ‘family’ aspect of Article 8. The European Court had a long entrenched approach99 
to not recognising same-sex relationships under the family aspect of Article 8.100 Instead, such 
relationships were always considered under the private life aspect.101  It was not until Schalk 
and Kopf v Austria (2010) that same-sex couples were recognised as having family rights.102 
This has been described as ‘remarkable’103 progress. The European Court justified its extension 
of case law on the basis of the ‘rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples.’104 
Again, although this case illustrates the dynamic interpretative techniques of the European 
Court, there was no explanation as to how the European Court gauged the change in social 
attitudes. There was consideration of the legislative status of same-sex couples internationally, 
but the European Court stated this was insufficient to amount to a European consensus in 
relation to same-sex marriage.105  Yet despite the lack of consensus in relation to same-sex 
marriage, the European Court did transform previous case law to recognise same-sex couples 
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having a right to family life under Article 8.  This approach of the European Court is confusing. 
A ‘rapid evolution of social attitudes’ cannot be the same as consensus as no consensus was 
determined to exist in relation to the right to marry.106 It appears from Schalk and Kopf v 
Austria (2010) that consensus is not needed for article 8 (right to a private and family life), but 
is required for article 12 (right to marry.) Yet again however, there is no clue as to when 
consensus will be reached for the purpose of Article 12. This piece sets out a suggestion that 
the European Court should clarify in future judgements when consensus will be deemed to 
have been reached.  
The lack of clarity as to the weight given to consensus arguments in this area is further revealed 
by the most recent line of cases before the European Court concerning civil partnership. In 
Vallianatos v Greece consensus played an important role in determining that there was a breach 
of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. 107   Where Greece had reserved civil 
partnership rights to opposite-sex couples only, an ‘evolving or ‘minority’ consensus’108 was 
deemed important as only two states who had introduced such statuses had reserved them 
specifically to opposite-sex couples. Confusingly this ‘minority’ consensus was seen as more 
important than the fact that overall (at that stage) only a minority of contracting states had 
introduced same-sex registered partnerships. This judgement shows that in some cases the 
European Court looks at consensus within a selected group of Member States, rather than 
consensus across all Member States.  
In Oliari v Italy (2015) consensus played an important role.109 The European Court performed 
an extensive survey of comparative law and found that for the first time a ‘thin majority’ of 
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states recognised a right to some level of civil partnership.110 This was an important reason for 
the European Court’s decision that Article 8 had been breached. Yet in other cases the European 
Court has taken no regard of consensus. In the recent case of Ratzenbock and Seydl v Austria,111 
which concerned an opposite sex couple wishing to enter into a civil partnership, on the 
grounds that this was a lighter form of recognition, the European Court did not consider 
consensus at all. Instead they majority of the European Court considered that different-sex 
couples were not in a comparable situation to that of same-sex couple. This was because the 
‘institutions of marriage and …. registered partnership [were] essentially complementary in 
Austrian law.’112 As no comparator was found the European Court did not go on to ‘..assess 
the difference of treatment or the justification for the difference.’113 This seems at odds with 
previous decisions made in Schalk and Kopf v Austria and Vallianatos v Greece where a 
comparison was made between same and different sex couples and their access to legal 
statuses.114 It also meant that the European Court never considered a consensus analysis at all, 
despite this being seen as decisive in Oliari v Italy.115 Interestingly Fenwick and Hayward 
argue that a consensus could be found in this area but depending on how the question is 
framed. 116  If the European Court had asked if following the introduction of same-sex 
partnerships, the majority of Member States had confined them to same-sex partners the answer 
would have been in the affirmative. However, if the European  Court had asked instead whether 
                                                          
110 Ibid.  
  
111 Ratzenbock and Seydl v Austria (Apps. No. 28475/12, ECtHR 26 October 2017) 
 
112 Ibid. para 40. 
 
113 Fenwick H and Hayward A. ‘Equal Civil Partnerships: Implications of Strasbourg’s Latest Ruling for 




114 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2) and Vallianatos v Greece (n7).  
 
115 Oliari v Italy (n3)  
 
116 Fenwick and Hayward UK Human Rights Blog (n113).  
the majority of states following introduction of same-sex partners had ‘maintained asymmetry 
of access’ the answer would have been in the negative, as most Member States following the 
introduction of registered partnerships, had gone on to introduce same-sex marriage.117 Austria 
is one of the few countries to have maintained registered partnerships for same-sex couples and 
marriage for opposite sex couples. This further serves to highlight the confusing treatment of 
consensus by the European Court. 
In a similar manner to the transformation of the legal treatment of gay people before the 
European Court, the treatment of trans gender persons by the European Court has also 
undergone a major change.118 Early case law resulted in a denial of trans persons’ rights and a 
wide MoA, due to a lack of consensus, was deemed necessary.119 Yet 16 years later trans 
persons’ rights were recognised, including the right to marry in their new sex.120 The European 
Court made a clear commitment to a ‘dynamic and evolutive approach’ in order to ‘render [the 
European Convention’s] rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.’ 121 
However, when reviewing the case law before the European Court, no clear explanation was 
given as to how the European Court justified this change in approach. The first in the line of 
case law did not deem it appropriate to consider the domestic law in Member States122 and 
merely stated that the matter be kept ‘under review’.123 Further case law did at least take note 
of international comparisons and established this as a valid methodology towards consensus 
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building.124  Eventually, 16 years later, the European Court was swayed by an ‘emerging 
consensus’125 and reference was also made to a ‘continuing international trend.’126   The variety 
of terminology used leads to confusion.127  On the facts as well over the 16 year period 
examined there had been very little progress in the number of European countries recognising 
trans persons’ rights.128 To add to the confusion, the European Court also examined states 
outside of Europe, including Australia and New Zealand. Brauch concludes that there are no 
legal standards to be found in such decisions, arguing that the European Court was not ‘engaged 
in legal analysis, but in policy making.’129  It creates difficulties for those wishing to determine 
when a consensus will be determined to have been reached in relation to same-sex marriage. 
This leads to a lack of clarity and predictability as to when the European Court will introduce 
same-sex marriage. The European Court frequently reverses previous cases. Reliance is made 
upon a consensus standard that is not thoroughly explained. Change is needed here. If the 
European Court determines that a matter falls within the MoA due to a lack of consensus, as is 
the case for same-sex marriage, Member States should be able to predict when a sufficient 
consensus will be deemed to have been reached.  
 
5. PROPOSED REFORM AND THE ADVANTAGES THIS WOULD BRING 
This piece suggests that if the European Court continues to stress the need for consensus in 
future judgements regarding same-sex marriage, they should at least outline how many 
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domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex marriage, before they will 
determine that a consensus will exist. This will increase the legitimacy of the European Court 
and also has major advantages of transparency, certainty and predictability. Legitimacy is a 
particularly important at present with certain political factions threatening to leave the Council 
of Europe.130  The ‘legitimacy of international law is usually attributed to the States’ [original] 
consent.131  This argument surely holds less weight 50 years after the originally signatures.132 
A question mark can also be raised as to how true the original consent argument holds in the 
face of the fact of the extensive interpretative techniques used by the European Court. As 
demonstrated above, the case law concerning sexualities has evolved rapidly over the course 
of the last few years.133 A challenge is therefore faced in Central and European states (whose 
people largely have a more conservative approach to these matters)134 to ensure enforcement 
of any judgment in this area.  
As Wintemute comments forcing minority views on the rest of the countries would ‘risk a 
political backlash, which could cause some governments [to] threaten to leave the convention 
system.’135 The European Court also faces ‘a substantial structural handicap’136 in getting its 
decisions enforced, as this depends upon the actions of Member States.137 Were the European 
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Court to take a leading role, too far in advance of public opinion, this could lead to a lack of 
enforcement. Examples of Member States failing to enforce decisions of the European Court 
are easy to find.138 Consensus remains an important argument and is ‘a vital force in judicial 
policy that the European Court uses when it fears that going against consensus will render its 
rulings ineffectual.’139 Several judges in the European Court have also opined that they believe 
there is a link between consensus and enforcement and acceptance of judgements.140 As an 
international court, the European Court is never going to have a democratic mandate. However, 
if consensus can be linked back to the democratic legislatures of Member States this will 
increase the legitimacy of the European Court’s role. The proposed reform also has the major 
advantages of increasing legitimacy, transparency, certainty and predictability. The European 
Court would be operating within the rule of law and not trespassing into a political role. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years there has been a transformation in the treatment of GLBT rights. The European 
Court now requires Member States to offer some form of legal protection to same-sex couples 
Europe wide (although this could be confined to countries where same-sex couples are accepted 
socially),141 but there continues to be no right to same-sex marriage.142 This is because of the 
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lack of consensus among Member States on the issue.143 There remains a divide between the 
largely liberal Western states and the more conservative states of Central and Eastern 
Europe.144 It seems likely, however, that at some stage the European Court will determine that 
there is a right to same-sex marriage.145 The difficulty remains that currently proponents of 
same-sex marriage are left with little to guide them as to when the European Court will 
determine this moment has arrived. Certainty is needed. This is due to the constitutional, 
manifold legal and symbolic implications of marriage.  It is essential for a couple to know if 
they can legally marry.146  
The issue of same-sex marriage recognition across Europe illustrates the difficult balance, 
which the European Court has to make between upholding the universal standard of human 
rights, whilst respecting regional differences.  In relation to same-sex marriage, it remains 
debateable as to whether the European Court is following the correct approach in considering 
lack of consensus, leading to a wide MoA, as determinative in relation to same-sex marriage. 
Critics argue that this ignores minorities147  and results in a lack of legal analysis148  and no 
high level of scrutiny.149 However, in politically sensitive areas such as same-sex marriage, the 
European Court wishes to avoid any charge that it is engaging in  ‘judicial politics.’150  A wide 
MoA, due to the emphasis on lack of consensus ensures that the European Court does not 
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overstep the ‘primary responsibility’151 given under the European Convention to Member 
States to secure human rights.152 Despite the emphasis on consensus it is far from clear how 
the European Court determines whether a consensus exists.153  There are also confusions in 
relation to the terminology used around consensus, where numerous version of the name are 
used.154 Again no consistency is demonstrated in determining what sources are appropriate for 
establishing a consensus.155 Analysis of case law relating to sexualities and family law reveals 
very little to aid our understanding. Despite advancing human rights protections for gay people 
and same-sex couples, case law demonstrates a very inconsistent and confusing approach to 
the use of consensus.156 Even worse, it results in the charge that the European Court is not 
acting in accordance with the rule of law.157  
This article sets out a novel approach by suggesting that if the European Court continues to 
stress the need for consensus in future judgements regarding same-sex marriage, they should 
at least outline how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex 
marriage, before they will determine that a consensus will exist. This will increase the 
legitimacy of the European Court as it would link any new decision on movement of consensus 
in relation to same-sex marriage back to a democratic mandate of the legislatures of the 
Member States concerned. This is needed at a time when certain political factions are 
discussing leaving the Council of Europe.158 Case law concerning sexualities has evolved 
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rapidly over the last few years.159 A challenge is therefore faced in Central and European states 
(whose people largely have a more conservative approach to these matters) 160  to ensure 
enforcement of any judgment in this area.  The European Court also faces ‘a substantial 
structural handicap’161 in getting its decisions enforced, as this depends upon the actions of 
Member States.162 Forcing minority views on countries who would otherwise be opposed could 
also result in a political backlash.163 Consensus therefore remains an important argument which 
many European judges opine is linked to enforcement and acceptance of judgements.164 As an 
international court, the European Court is never going to have a democratic mandate. However, 
if consensus can be linked back to the democratic legislatures of the Member States concerned 
this can increase the legitimacy of the European Court’s role. Consensus could therefore, if 
applied in the suggested more consistent manner aid the legitimacy of judgements. The 
proposed reform would also improve transparency, certainty and predictability as proponents 
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